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I. INTRODUCTION
ON Monday, January 10, 2017, some twenty-six million viewerstuned in to watch the Clemson Tigers beat the Alabama CrimsonTide with a last-second touchdown to clinch the title of National
Champions for the first time since 1981.1 The world watched as those
players’ dreams came true on national television, which certainly led to
millions of young viewers longing to be the next Deshaun Watson on
their way to the NFL Draft, regardless of the numerous “[m]onster
[h]it[s]” he took during the game.2 On February 5, 2017, more dreams
became a reality, and more young viewers were inspired, as the New En-
gland Patriots were named Super Bowl LI Champions.3
While football is certainly the main topic of conversation in the winter
months, the National Hockey League is just ramping up. Fans, both
young and seasoned, are beginning to make their predictions for the
Stanley Cup playoffs and secure their seats to see unbelievable goals and
1. Derek Volner, More than 26 Million Viewers Watched the College Football Playoff
National Championship, ESPN MEDIA ZONE (Jan. 10, 2017), http://espnmediazone.com/us/
press-releases/2017/01/26-million-viewers-watched-college-football-playoff-national-cham-
pionship/ [https://perma.cc/M8CM-2PN3]; Travis Waldron, Clemson Scores with 1 Second
Left to Beat Alabama, Win National Championship, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/clemson-alabama-national-championship_us_58747
5d0e4b02b5f858adf9e [https://perma.cc/3PEZ-98XY].
2. Steve Wright, Deshaun Watson Takes Monster Hit in the National Title Game,
HEROSPORTS (Jan. 9, 2017), http://herosports.com/news/deshaun-watson-huge-hit-college-
football-highlights-fbs-football [https://perma.cc/8RUA-2SPP].
3. Benjamin Hoffman, Here’s How the Patriots Won Their Fifth Super Bowl, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/sports/super-bowl-score-patriots-
falcons.html (Perma link unavailable).
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grueling fights, which are said to be “part of the fabric” of the game.4
Today, many of those enthusiastic fans anticipating the severe brawls will
not even be old enough to vote, as participation in hockey in the United
States has risen 44% among six to seventeen-year-olds since 2010.5
After seeing these players glorified in the media and paid enormous
salaries, millions of parents will be forced to make the inevitable decision
of whether to let their children play these dangerous sports. This decision
must be made under the pressure of a society that idolizes these players
for their physical and mental toughness, while increased studies have
made society undeniably aware of the immediate and long-term side ef-
fects of these high contact sports.
The influx of information in the last decade on these risky and life-
threatening side effects has put a major spotlight on the leagues and
teams as to their role in encouraging players to play through the pain and
concealing pertinent information on the risks of their job.6 Plaintiff’s law-
yers have likely lined up to represent players, and even relatives of play-
ers, in the recent years with the hopes of holding the leagues and teams
accountable for their decisions.
However, there has been a major procedural hurdle for almost all
plaintiffs bringing a state law tort claim against a professional league or
team: Section 301 preemption.7 Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Section 301) grants jurisdiction to federal courts over any
litigation arising from violations of collective bargaining agreements
(CBA(s)) and completely preempts state law claims “founded directly on
rights created by collective-bargaining agreements and claims substan-
tially dependent on analysis of such agreements.”8 While at first glance
whether a claim is preempted or not may seem like a relatively simple
decision for courts, Section 301 preemption, especially in the realm of
professional sports, “has been one of the most confused areas of federal
court litigation.”9
Understanding how courts interpret and apply Section 301 preemption
is crucial, as it is likely the first obstacle that plaintiffs bringing state law
claims against the leagues or teams will encounter. If the defendants suc-
cessfully argue the claims should be preempted, the state court claims will
be dismissed and must be pursued through the grievance procedure set
4. DJ Gallo, Sorry, NHL Fans: Fighting Is Here to Stay, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/06/nfl-fighting-hockey-study [https://
perma.cc/747J-ZGSN].
5. Bill King, Are the Kids Alright?, SPORTS BUSINESS DAILY GLOBAL JOURNAL (Aug.
10, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2015/08/10/In-Depth/
Lead.aspx [https://perma.cc/R3GN-6HLY].
6. See generally Robert M. Sagerian, Note, A Penalty Flag for Preemption: The NFL
Concussion Litigation, Tortious Fraud, and the Steel Curtain Defense of Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 229 (2013).
7. See id. at 266.
8. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 387 (1987).
9. See Stephanie R. Marcus, Note, The Need for a New Approach to Federal Preemp-
tion of Union Members State Law Claims, 99 YALE L.J. 209, 209 (1989).
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out in the controlling CBA, which is typically mandatory arbitration.10
This potentially leads to a reduction in damages and availability of certain
awards such as punitive damages, and it typically allows the defendant to
keep all information in the hearing private as to avoid any public
scrutiny.11
In the pivotal case, Turner v. NFL (In re NFL Players’ Concussion In-
jury Litigation), a group of retired NFL players brought action against
the NFL alleging the league breached its duties by failing to protect its
players from risks that occur as a result of concussive head injuries and by
concealing those risks.12 After the judge in Turner avoided ruling on the
preemption issue of those claims by mandating mediation, confusion on
the subject has grown.13 This comment argues that, as a result of recent
publicity and awareness on the lack of protection and vulnerability of
professional athletes to immediate and long-term injury, the courts are
adding to the confusion of Section 301 preemption by reining in the appli-
cability of the doctrine, which has increasingly expanded over time.
Judges are narrowing the use of Section 301 preemption in these cases to
ensure that the victims are sufficiently remedied, and the defendants are
not able to evade liability by using this doctrine. Furthermore, this shift in
the preemption analysis will have great effects on future agreement nego-
tiations, settlement negotiations, insurance premiums for the defendants,
and plaintiffs looking to bring new lawsuits in this area.
Part II of this comment provides a background on Section 301 preemp-
tion and its application in the lawsuits brought by professional athletes.
Part III discusses the applicable cases in professional sports in which
courts have recently dealt with a Section 301 preemption defense, as well
as the cases that are pending based on preemption. Part IV analyzes the
reasoning in the recent cases and whether the doctrine is being correctly
applied. Part V gives predictions for the pending cases, discusses the im-
pact of the courts analyses, and argues a need for clarification by the Su-
preme Court on Section 301 preemption.
10. John Guccione, Moving Past A “Pocket Change” Settlement: The Threat of Pre-
emption and How the Loss of Chance Doctrine Can Help NFL Concussion Plaintiffs Prove
Causation, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 907, 925 (2014).
11. See id. at 925–26; Michael Telis, Playing Through the Haze: The NFL Concussion
Litigation and Section 301 Preemption, 102 GEO. L.J. 1841, 1846 (2014).
12. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351,
362–64 (E.D. Pa. 2015), amended by No. 2:12-MD-02323-AB, 2015 WL 12827803 (E.D. Pa.
May 8, 2015), and aff’d sub nom. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury
Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (May 2, 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Gil-
christ v. Nat’l Football League, No. 16-283, 2016 WL 4585281 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016), and
cert. denied sub nom. Armstrong v. Nat’l Football League, No. 16-413, 2016 WL 7182246
(U.S. Dec. 12, 2016).
13. See id. at 363.
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II. BACKGROUND OF SECTION 301 PREEMPTION AND ITS
APPLICATION IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
A. SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), also known as the
Taft-Hartley Act, was enacted in 1947.14 The Act was a way to demobilize
the labor movement by imposing limits on the ability to strike.15 The pur-
pose of the Act was “to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations . . . [and] to protect the rights of individ-
ual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities
affect commerce.”16 Section 301 of the LMRA reads, “Suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .”17
The policy behind Section 301 preemption is to encourage “uniformity of
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and prevention of in-
terference with those agreements.”18
Section 301 may completely preempt state law claims, but also, “the
LMRA may supersede a plaintiff’s claims under ordinary preemption
principles, in which case those claims must be construed as § 301 claims,
or dismissed and pursued through the grievance procedure set out in the
controlling CBA.”19 The Supreme Court stated that Section 301 autho-
rizes federal courts to enforce CBAs, including “specific performance of
promises to arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining
agreements.”20
Moreover, in 1985, the Supreme Court, in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, went further to extend Section 301 preemption to state-law tort
actions, which expanded the doctrine dramatically.21 Writing the majority
opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed concern that “[a]ny other result
would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the re-
quirements of [Section] 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims
for tortious breach of contract.”22
B. THE TEST FOR SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been less than clear in defining
the Section 301 preemption doctrine. Although the Supreme Court has
14. See Telis, supra note 11, at 1847 (citing LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE
WORKPLACE 33–34 (2d ed. 2005).
15. Id.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2012).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012).
18. Kelly A. Heard, The Impact of Preemption in the NFL Concussion Litigation, 68
U. MIAMI L. REV. 221, 227 (2013).
19. In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856,
865 (D. Minn. 2016) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1985)).
20. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957).
21. 471 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1985).
22. Id. at 211.
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never expressed its prior opinions as creating a two-prong test to deter-
mine preemption, many lower courts articulate it as such: “a state-law
claim is preempted by Section 301 if either (1) resolution of that claim
would substantially depend upon analysis of the terms of the CBA, or (2)
the alleged duty arises from the CBA.”23
The first prong is essentially the test the Court developed in Allis-Chal-
mers and Lingle.24 In Allis-Chalmers, the Supreme Court stated that
whether a claim is preempted is determined by whether resolution of the
state-law claim is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the
terms of the labor contract.”25 Then, in Lingle, the Court held the state-
law claim was preempted because “[n]either of those elements [of the
state law claim] requires a court to interpret any term of a collective-
bargaining agreement.”26 Thus, the Court implied that a claim is only pre-
empted under Section 301 if the resolution of the claim requires interpre-
tation of the CBA.
The second prong can be said to be a subset of the first prong as the
Supreme Court conveyed in International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers: if the duties alleged in the complaint are duties that only exist
because of the CBA, then the CBA must be interpreted to examine the
nature and scope of those duties.27 The Court held that the plaintiff’s
state-law tort claim was preempted because the alleged duty of care arose
from the CBA rather that state tort law.28 Three years later in Rawson,
the Court used the same test to find that the state-law tort action was
preempted because the alleged duties arose from the collective bargain-
ing contract rather than from common law tort principles.29
The majority of issues with Section 301 preemption have arisen when
dealing with the first prong of the test. These issues include what exactly
“interpretation” of the CBA means, what “inextricably intertwined”
means, and what “substantially dependent upon” means. In Allis-Chal-
mers, the Court advised that mere reference to a provision in a CBA
would not qualify as “interpretation” for preemption purposes.30 Thus,
the Court cautioned in 1957 that the preemption doctrine was to be de-
fined narrowly and not used to dismiss otherwise valid claims.
In Livadas, the Supreme Court stated that merely “look[ing] to” a
CBA when determining if a claim is preempted is not the equivalent to
23. Telis, supra note 11, at 1850.
24. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 399 (1988); Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 471 U.S. at 220.
25. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 213.
26. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 400.
27. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 851 (1987).
28. Id. at 851–52.
29. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 373–84
(1990).
30. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 220 (noting that its holding did not require that
“every state-law suit asserting a right that relates in some way to a provision in a collective-
bargaining agreement . . . necessarily is pre-empted by § 301.”)
2017] Open Field for Professional Athlete Litigation 481
interpretation.31 Moreover, the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have both emphasized the term “interpret” in the preemption con-
text must be defined narrowly—something more than consider, refer to,
or apply.32 Otherwise, as the Balcorta panel noted, all actions brought by
a unionized employee would be preempted because the court will always
be required to look at the underlying elements of the state claims, as well
as the CBA, to determine if the state action is dependent upon an analy-
sis of the CBA.33
As a leading sports law expert stated, “[I]f the state law creates a right
separate and apart from the rights created by the [CBA], the state law
claim will not be preempted, even if the analysis of the state law claim
would overlap with the analysis of a claim brought under the terms of the
[CBA].”34 Thus, the most relevant consideration for the court is how
closely tied the state law at issue is to the CBA.35 However, another im-
portant exception to the preemption doctrine was articulated in Allis-
Chalmers when the Court explained that state laws that “proscribe con-
duct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract”
are not preempted.36 Thus, Section 301 does not allow parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement to rewrite state law.
As the various outcomes of the preemption cases demonstrate, Section
301 preemption has created confusion, and the standard for determining
preemption is vulnerable to differing applications. Some commentators
have opined that Section 301 preemption has been expanded far beyond
what the language of the section demands and has been abused by de-
fendants.37 However, the Court has long defended that approach arguing
the need for uniform federal law in labor disputes and to ensure specific
performance of arbitration clauses.38
C. APPLICATION OF SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
TO THE NFL AND NHL
Both the players in the National Hockey League (NHL) and the Na-
tional Football League (NFL) are represented by player’s associations
31. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994).
32. Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000);
Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998).
33. Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1108.
34. Dana A. Gittleman, Home Field Advantage: Determining the Appropriate Turf for
Williams v. National Football League and Clarifying Preemption Precedent, 19 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 219 (2012) (citing The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports’Anti-Dop-
ing Programs at a Legal Crossroads? Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade & Con-
sumer Prot. of the HR Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (testimony of
Gabriel A. Feldman, Associate Professor of Law and Director of Tulane Sports Law Pro-
gram, Tulane University School of Law), available at http://democrats.energycommerce
.house.gov/Press111/20091103/feldmantestimony.pdf [herein referred to as “Feldman”]).
35. Id.
36. 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985).
37. Preemption Is the Focus, NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION (Dec. 7, 2014), http://nfl-
concussionlitigation.com/?p=1722 [https://perma.cc/2UT9-RHC6].
38. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
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which negotiate CBAs on their behalf.39 The National Hockey League
Players’ Association (NHLPA) represented the NHL players in the CBA
ratified in January of 2013, which describes the conditions of employment
for all players as well as the rights of the NHL, NHLPA, and the NHL
Clubs.40 This current CBA is effective until September 15, 2022.41
The current NFL CBA went into effect August 4, 2011, and extends
through 2020.42 Unlike in the NHL CBA, the NFL is not a party to this
agreement.43 The NFL CBA is an agreement entered into by the National
Football League Management Council (NFLMC) and the National Foot-
ball League Players Association (NFLPA) which represents all present
and future employee players in the NFL.44 The NFLMC is a multi-em-
ployer bargaining association that represents all present and future em-
ployer member Clubs of the NFL.45
Notably, if the plaintiff is a retired player, the defendant must deter-
mine whether the retired player was subject to a CBA, which means they
must demonstrate when the cause of action accrued.46 Furthermore, the
defendant must make this determination in order to know which CBA
may be applicable, as different versions of the CBA may have disparate
language.47 For example, the NFLPA and the NFLMC have negotiated
seven different agreements since 1968.48 The NHL and the NHLPA have
negotiated four different agreements since 1994.49
Thus, when a current or former NHL or NFL player brings a state-law
claim against the league or the clubs, the application of Section 301 pre-
emption to the claim will be of great significance. The players’ associa-
tions are an important tool for professional athletes as they create
established entities and a formidable bargaining force for the players who
otherwise may be seemingly powerless in negotiations. Collective bar-
gaining has increased benefits, stability, and uniformity for professional
athletes, and has allowed them to have a voice while working for some of
39. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, NFL PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION (2011), availa-
ble at https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMK8-EDML]; Collective Bargaining Agreement, NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION (2012), http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa/col-
lective-bargaining-agreement [https://perma.cc/6WPW-ZLDT] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
40. Collective Bargaining Agreement, NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCI-
ATION (2012), supra note 39.
41. Id.
42. Collective Bargaining Agreement, NFL PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, supra note 39.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Oral Argument at 21:31, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA,
2014 WL 7205048 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gvVpI
viwKw [https://perma.cc/UB7D-AY66].
46. In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856,
860 (D. Minn. 2016).
47. Id.
48. NFL Labor History Since 1968, ESPN (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.espn.com/nfl/
news/story?page=nfl_labor_history [https://perma.cc/LL2R-FKDB].
49. Braden Shaw, The Solution to NHL Collective Bargaining Disputes: Mandatory
Binding Arbitration, 10 DEPAUL J. OF SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 58–61 (2014).
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the most powerful employers in the world. However, these agreements
have raised an incredible impediment for players who seek to hold the
leagues and teams accountable for actions or non-actions that they be-
lieve fall outside of these agreements.
III. RECENT CASE LAW REGARDING PROFESSIONAL
ATHLETE INJURY
A. SIGNIFICANT CASE LAW PRIOR TO TURNER V. NFL
1. Stringer v. NFL
In 2006, the widow of Korey Stringer, a former Minnesota Viking, sued
the NFL for negligence after Korey died of heat exhaustion and a heat-
stroke that he suffered during the preseason.50 The claim alleged the NFL
breached its duty “to use ordinary care in overseeing, controlling, and
regulating practices, policies, procedures, equipment, working conditions
and culture of the NFL teams . . . to minimize the risk of heat-related
illness.”51 The NFL moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were preempted
under Section 301, and the Southern District of Ohio agreed, finding that
resolution of the claim would require interpretation of the CBA.52
The court held the NFL owed a duty to all NFL players when it volun-
tarily published Hot Weather Guidelines as part of its 2001 Games Oper-
ations Manual, and because the CBA “places primary responsibility” for
treating player health on the club physicians, the CBA provisions doing
so “must . . . be taken into account in determining the degree of care
owed by the NFL.”53 The court held that “[t]he question of whether the
NFL was negligent in publishing the Hot Weather Guidelines . . . is inex-
tricably intertwined with certain key provisions of the CBA.”54 Thus, the
duties alleged did not arise out of the CBA, but the court held that the
CBA necessarily had to be interpreted to determine the scope of any du-
ties and therefore, the claim was preempted.55
2. Duerson v. NFL
David Duerson played in the NFL for ten years, and in 2011, just three
months after his death, Duerson’s brain was diagnosed with chronic trau-
matic encephalopathy.56 Duerson’s estate then sued the NFL for wrong-
ful death alleging that Duerson’s suicide was a result of the brain damage
he incurred while playing in the NFL.57 The NFL moved to remove the
case to federal court, arguing that evaluating the reasonableness of the
50. Stringer v. NFL, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
51. Id. at 899.
52. Id. at 911.
53. Id. at 910–11.
54. Id. at 910.
55. Id. at 903–11.
56. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012).
57. Id.
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NFL’s conduct would require interpretation of provisions from the CBAs
during Duerson’s time, which imposed duties on the NFL clubs to protect
player health and safety.58
Thus, even though the CBA only imposed duties on the NFL clubs, not
the league itself, the court held they would have to interpret the CBA to
determine whether the club’s duty was triggered.59 After the club’s duty
to protect Duerson was established, it would then “be one factor tending
to show that the NFL’s alleged failure to take action to protect Duerson
from concussive brain trauma was reasonable.”60
3. Maxwell v. Nat’l Football League, Inc.
In July 2011, seventy-five former players filed suit against the NFL al-
leging the league concealed data about the dangers of concussions.61
Judge Real stated, “[t]he plaintiffs’ complaints allege a failure to ensure
accurate diagnosis and recording of concussive brain injures so that the
condition can be treated in an adequate . . . manner.”62 The court noted
that under the CBA, the NFL club doctors assumed primary responsibil-
ity for physical care and thus, “[t]he provisions of the [CBA] must be
taken into account in determining the degree of care owed by the
NFL.”63 The plaintiff’s attorney noted his disappointment “that the NFL
made a little headway in using the collective bargaining agreement to try
to escape liability to former NFL players.”64
4. Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC
In May 2014, plaintiff’s lawyers received good news when Judge Perry
remanded to state court a suit brought by three former NFL players
against the Arizona Cardinals Football Club, holding that “the merits of
the plaintiffs’ claims can be evaluated without interpreting any of the
[CBAs’] terms.”65 The plaintiff’s claims were based on common law du-
ties to maintain a safe working environment, not to expose employees to
unreasonable risks of harm, and to warn employees about the existence
of dangers of which they could not reasonably be expected to be aware.66
Judge Perry held that the applicable CBAs did not have any bearing on
these claims.67
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id. at *6.
60. Id. at *4.
61. Ashley Hayes & Michael Martinez, Former NFL Players: League Concealed Con-
cussion Risks, CNN (July 20, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/07/20/nfl.lawsuit
.concussions/ [https://perma.cc/87LA-ESQR].
62. Zach Winnick, NFL Head Injury Suits Remain in Calif. Federal Court, LAW360




65. Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1023 (E.D.
Mo. 2014).
66. Id. at 1024.
67. Id. at 1030.
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Judge Perry also held the CBA did not have any bearing on the players’
negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment claims, as they
arose from common law duties of an employer “‘to inform himself of
those matters of scientific knowledge’ that relate to the hazards of his
business and to relay that knowledge to his employees.”68 Thus, this case
was an enormous win for the plaintiffs and future plaintiffs, as Judge
Perry neglected to continue expanding the reach of Section 301
preemption.
5. Dent v. NFL
Also in May 2014, more than 500 former players filed suit against the
NFL claiming that team physicians withheld injury information and rou-
tinely, and illegally, gave the players dangerous painkillers so they would
remain on the field despite their injuries.69 These serious allegations
likely weighed heavy on the public because they claimed the teams used
opioids, anti-inflammatories, and anesthetics without required prescrip-
tions and with little or no regard for a player’s medical history or poten-
tially fatal interactions with other medications.70 However, these claims
were dismissed shortly after, in December 2014, due to Section 301
preemption.71
Judge Alsup stated that it would be impossible to apply the state com-
mon law duties on the league without considering the parties’ CBA.72
The plaintiff’s counsel argued the CBA applied only to current and future
players, not former ones, and accused the NFL of trying to shield itself by
arguing it was the duty of the individual clubs, not the league, to inform
about these risks and ensure players were medicated properly.73 The
plaintiffs argued that their claims were based on illegal conduct of the
defendant and that “[Section] 301 does not grant the parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under
state law.”74 Judge Alsup dismissed that argument by distinguishing a
claim brought based on a violation of a federal statute with a claim based
on negligence in which a federal statute may be implicated.75
While Green was an exciting victory in 2014 for plaintiffs and profes-
sional athletes, Judge Alsup’s decision to dismiss the claims in the Dent
case disparaged that victory. Judge Alsup noted in his opinion that the
claims certainly do address an “underlying societal issue . . . [p]roper care
of [player] injuries is likewise a paramount need.”76 He continued by stat-
ing, “[t]he main point of this order is that the league has addressed these
68. Id. (citing Marsanick v. Luechtefeld, 157 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942)).
69. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *7.
73. Id. at *7, *10.
74. See id. at *10.
75. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *10.
76. Id. at *12.
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serious concerns in a serious way — by imposing duties on the clubs via
collective bargaining and placing a long line of health-and-safety duties
on the team owners themselves.”77
B. TURNER V. NFL (IN RE NFL PLAYERS’ CONCUSSION
INJURY LITIGATION)
In 2012, the NFL was hit with what was referred to as the “mega-law-
suit”78 as former NFL players consolidated over eighty pending lawsuits
comprised of over one thousand former NFL players into one complaint
that accused the NFL of multiple state law tort claims, including medical
monitoring, negligent hiring and retention, negligent misrepresentation,
fraud and fraudulent concealment, and wrongful death.79
As predicted by many, the NFL’s first play was a motion to dismiss all
state-law claims under Section 301 of the LMRA.80 They argued that Sec-
tion 301 preempts the claims because their resolution substantially de-
pends upon analysis of the terms of the CBA.81 If successful, the former
player’s claims would have had to be brought pursuant to the mechanism
set forth in the CBA, which was arbitration.82 The plaintiffs’ attorneys
argued back that their claims were all independent of the CBA and thus,
were properly justiciable in federal court.83
Judge Anita Brody heard oral arguments on the league’s motion to
dismiss, but before ruling on the motion, she ordered the parties to medi-
ate.84 Just under two months later, in August 2013, the league entered
into a tentative settlement agreement with the players for $765 million to
provide medical benefits and injury compensation for retired NFL play-
ers, fund medical and safety research, and cover litigation expenses.85
However, Judge Brody denied approval of this settlement out of concern
“that not all retired NFL football players who ultimately receive a quali-
fying diagnosis or their [families] . . . will be paid.”86
Finally, in April 2015, Judge Brody approved a settlement between the
parties spanning over the next sixty-five years and figuring to cost the
77. Id.
78. The NFL Is Facing a Mega-Lawsuit on Concussions, CSNPHILLY (June 7, 2012),
www.csnphilly.com/nfl-facing-mega-lawsuit-concussions?amp [https://perma.cc/H596-
UU6F].
79. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 361
(E.D. Pa. 2015), amended by No. 2:12-MD-02323-AB, 2015 WL 12827803 (E.D. Pa. May 8,
2015), and aff’d sub nom. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821
F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016), as amended (May 2, 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Gilchrist v. Nat’l
Football League (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016), and cert. denied sub nom. Armstrong v. Nat’l Foot-
ball League (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016).
80. Id. at 362–63.
81. Id.
82. Telis, supra note 11, at 1844–45.
83. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 361.
84. Id. at 363.
85. Id. at 364.
86. $765M NFL Concussion Settlement May Not Be Enough, Judge Says, CBS NEWS
(Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/765m-nfl-concussion-settlement-may-not-be-
enough-judge-says/ [https://perma.cc/J6NU-ZWUD].
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NFL an estimated $900 million or more.87 Brody described the settlement
as “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”88 While there may be disagreement
on the adequacy of that settlement, one thing is certain—Judge Brody
avoided an incredibly tough legal question of whether these claims should
have been dismissed based on Section 301 preemption, which may have
left the plaintiffs with a lower amount of damages.89
C. CASE LAW FOLLOWING TURNER V. NFL
1. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC
In May 2015, just one month after Turner was settled, the same plain-
tiffs in Dent sued again.90 This time, they sued the thirty-two NFL teams
individually, claiming their doctors, trainers, and medical staffs obtained
and provided dangerous painkillers, often illegally, as a part of a conspir-
acy to keep players on the field without regard to their long-term
health.91
Reprising many of the same allegations in Dent, the complaint asserts
the teams and their staffs withheld information from players about the
seriousness of their injuries, while at the same time, handing out prescrip-
tion painkillers to mask their pain and maximize playing time.92 The play-
ers assert that “prescriptions were filled out in their names without their
knowledge.”93
The defendant’s motion to transfer to Judge Alsup was granted in or-
der to conserve judicial resources, as Judge Alsup was already familiar
with the facts of the claims.94 As expected after Judge Alsup’s ruling in
Dent, the defendant moved to dismiss based on Section 301 preemption.95
However, Judge Alsup delivered an unexpected opinion as he denied the
motion to dismiss in July 2016, allowing the case to proceed to the discov-
87. Gary Mihoces & Rachel Axon, Judge Approves Settlement – at Least $900M – to
NFL Concussion Lawsuits, USA TODAY (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nfl/2015/04/22/concussion-related-lawsuits-judge-settlement-nfl/26199011/ [https://
perma.cc/C4NX-M5H6].
88. In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 361.
89. See Sarah James, Ringing the Bell for the Last Time: How the NFL’s Settlement
Agreement Overwhelmingly Disfavors NFL Players Living with Chronic Traumatic En-
cephalopathy (CTE), 11 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 391, 395 (2016).
90. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. CV WMN-15-1457, 2016 WL
759208, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016).
91. Id.
92. NFL Players’ Medications Use Suit Against Clubs Is Transferred to California,
LEXIS LEGAL NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.lexislegalnews.com/articles/6422/nfl-play-
ers-medications-use-suit-against-clubs-is-transferred-to-california (Perma link
unavailable).
93. Hundreds of Former Players Sue the NFL Accusing Team Officials of Conspiring
to Push Painkillers on Them in a Bid to Keep Them on the Field, DAILY MAIL (May 21,
2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3091646/Former-players-NFL-teams-con-
spired-push-painkillers.html (Perma link unavailable).
94. Evans, 2016 WL 759208, at *3.
95. Id. at *1.
488 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
ery phase.96
In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Alsup attempted to distinguish
this case from Dent in two ways.97 First, he stated that the claims in Dent
were directed at the NFL and here, the plaintiffs are alleging misconduct
on the part of the clubs.98 Second, he stated the Evans claims are
grounded in intentional illegal conduct on the part of the clubs and there-
fore, they fall under the illegality exception, whereas, the thrust of the
complaint in Dent was under negligence.99
The clubs argued, unsuccessfully, that the players were attempting to
evade preemption by simply referencing the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act and the Controlled Substances Act, but they were still merely assert-
ing state law claims just as in Dent.100 In allowing the case to move for-
ward, Judge Alsup stated, “this Court is unwilling to categorically
immunize defendant clubs’ illegal and indiscriminate distribution of
painkillers as alleged in the complaint.”101
2. Bush v. St. Louis
In January 2016, Reggie Bush sued the St. Louis Convention and Visi-
tors Commission and the St. Louis Rams over a season-ending knee in-
jury he suffered when he slipped on uncovered concrete.102 Bush alleged
claims of premises liability and negligence against the Rams in allowing
the exposed concrete at the stadium to be uncovered.103 The team re-
moved the case to federal court, arguing that “both parties were bound
by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the terms and
conditions of employment of NFL players,” and thus, the claims were
preempted by Section 301.104 The Rams argued that an analysis of the
CBA and its documents was necessary to determine the scope of the
team’s duty to the players.105
The Missouri federal court sent the lawsuit back to state court, citing
Allis-Chalmers: “[S]ection 301 does not preempt state law claims merely
because the parties involved are subject to a CBA and the events under-
lying the claim occurred on the job.”106 The court held “the Rams’ duty
to warn [the players] exists independently of the Committee’s responsibil-
ity to develop a standardized preseason and postseason physical examina-
96. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL
3566945, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id.
102. Bush v. St. Louis Reg’l Convention, No. 4:16CV250 JCH, 2016 WL 3125869, at *1
(E.D. Mo. June 3, 2016).
103. Id.
104. Joseph M. Hanna, Reggie Bush’s Stadium Slip Suit Will Go Back to State Court,
SPORTS LAW INSIDER (June 8, 2016), http://sportslawinsider.com/reggie-bushs-stadium-slip-
suit-will-go-back-to-state-court/ [https://perma.cc/ZUB7-SWFN].
105. Bush, 2016 WL 3125869, at *1.
106. Hanna, supra note 104.
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tion, and to develop an educational protocol to inform players of the
primary risks associated with playing professional football.”107
The court noted that the strongest argument the Rams made was that
there is a provision in the CBA which requires the establishment of a
Joint Committee for the purpose of discussing the players safety and wel-
fare aspects of playing equipment, playing surfaces, and stadium facili-
ties.108 Following the narrow application used by Judge Perry in Green,
the court held, “[m]ere reference to part of a CBA is insufficient,” and
the Rams did not demonstrate how the court would have to interpret the
CBA to resolve their claim.109 Thus, the court allowed Bush to maintain
his state-law claims and move forward with the case.110
3. Boogaard v. NHL
Derek Boogaard played in the NHL for six seasons before he was
found dead of an accidental overdose of prescription painkillers and alco-
hol in May 2011.111 In 2012, the Boogaard family filed a lawsuit against
the NHLPA, but the case was dismissed based on the statute of limita-
tions.112 In 2013, the Boogaard family then filed a wrongful-death lawsuit
against the NHL claiming the NHL is responsible for the physical trauma
and brain damages Boogaard sustained in his time in the league and for
his addiction to prescription painkillers.113
The Boogaard family alleged the NHL “allowed and encouraged
Derek Boogaard, after suffering [a] concussion, to return to play and
fight in the same game and/or practice.”114 The suit alleged Boogaard was
given at least thirteen injections of a masking agent for pain in the last
two years of his career, by doctors of at least seven NHL teams.115 The
NHL moved to dismiss the claims by arguing Section 301 preemption,
and the motion was granted in December 2015.116
In September 2016, the Boogaard family moved to file a second
amended complaint, and the NHL opposed the filing on the grounds that
the new claims would all be preempted just as the claims in the first com-
plaint.117 However, Judge Feinerman found that the first four claims of
the second amended complaint were not preempted because the “NHL
[did] not attempt to explain how claims alleging active misdeeds would
107. Bush, 2016 WL 3125869, at *4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at *5.
110. Id.
111. Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
112. Boogaard’s Lawsuit Tossed Out of Court, NFL CONCUSSION LITIGATION (April
24, 2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1436 [https://perma.cc/84XG-63EB].
113. John Branch, In Suit Over Death, Boogaard’s Family Blames the N.H.L., N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/sports/hockey/derek-boogaards-
family-sues-nhl-for-wrongful-death.html (Perma link unavailable).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.
117. Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 13 C 4846, 2016 WL 5476242, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 29, 2016).
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require interpretation of the CBA,” but rather, the league merely argued
the counts were “‘repackaged’ versions of the other preempted
claims.”118
The first four claims of the second amended complaint allege the NHL
increased the risk of Boogaard’s brain damage, addiction, and depression
by promoting violence in spite of the obvious dangers, and that the NHL
negligently and fraudulently concealed evidence from Boogaard about
the dangers of head injuries, even though it had studies on how the inju-
ries would affect the players.119 The judge held they would need to inter-
pret the CBA to determine whether the NHL had a duty to eliminate
violence, but they would not need to interpret the CBA to determine if
the NHL acted unreasonably in a way that injured others.120
D. PENDING CASES
1. Dent v. NFL
After Judge Alsup granted the NFL’s motion to dismiss in Dent in De-
cember 2014, the plaintiffs filed an appeal.121 Recently, on December 8,
2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments on the
appeal.122 The plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in finding that
the CBA preempts the claims, and the NFL reiterated its position that the
court will have to interpret the agreement in order to resolve the case.123
Judge Kozinski questioned the NFL extensively on why the labor con-
tracts exempt the NFL, especially since the league is not a signatory on
six of the seven collective bargaining agreements.124 Judge Kozinski com-
pared the NFL to a random third party, such as a player’s wife, who in-
structs a team doctor to give her husband more pain medicine.125 The
NFL responded that the league acts as a “super employer” and is “inte-
grally involved” in the collective bargaining process, so even though it is
not a signatory, it is not a random third party.126
Judge Bybee questioned the holding by the district court after Judge
Alsup’s opinion in Evans.127 He was perplexed on how preemption would
not apply to the clubs in Evans, but would apply to the league.128 Counsel
for the NFL had no option but to reply that Judge Alsup got it wrong in
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id. at *1–3.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Cara Bayles, NFL Players Take Claim League Pushed Pills to 9th Circ., LAW360
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/873334/nfl-players-take-claim-league-
pushed-pills-to-9th-circ [https://perma.cc/KZ4X-T4WW].
122. Id.
123. Oral Argument at 12:08, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA,
2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gv
VpIviwKw [https://perma.cc/UB7D-AY66].
124. Id. at 21:20.
125. Id. at 18:26.
126. Id. at 19:15.
127. Id. at 27:34.
128. Id.
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Evans.129 Plaintiff’s counsel argued the illegality argument Judge Alsup
accepted in Evans, urging the court to not allow the NFL to hide behind
the CBA.130 Plaintiff’s counsel ended by stating, “We’re asking simply for
discovery . . . the plaintiffs and 1,300 players who signed up to part of the
putative class have a right to know who did this to them.”131 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision will be of great significance in Section 301 preemption
going forward.
2. Reconsideration of Boogaard v. NHL
On November 4, 2016, the NHL asked Judge Feinerman of the North-
ern District of Illinois to reconsider its decision to allow the second
amended complaint, insisting the claims fell under the CBA.132 The NHL
argued any communications with players about concussions was governed
by contract.133 The NHL explained the plaintiffs’ complaint as alleging
that the NHL breached their duty to Boogaard by failing to protect him
from the risk that it allegedly created by allowing fighting to continue.134
The NHL argued that Boogaard must show that the league violated a
duty of care by failing to change the playing rules to eliminate the risk to
which he was exposed, and the question of the league’s authority to
change the rules are at the front and center of the second amended com-
plaint.135 Thus, the claims are preempted, as they must interpret the
CBA, even if the duty is created independently.136
3. Ryans v. Houston
After Reggie Bush successfully defended a preemption defense, an-
other personal injury lawsuit was filed by an NFL player over an injury
suffered because of the condition of the playing field.137 NFL Philadel-
phia Eagles player, DeMeco Ryans, filed suit in October 2016 in Texas
state court against the Houston Texans after he suffered a career-ending
Achilles tendon injury in a November 2014 game against the Texans.138
Ryans claims his injury was caused by the “seams” in the removable, nat-
ural-grass playing surface at the Texans’ stadium.139
As expected, the Texans removed the case to federal court arguing the
129. Id. at 28:18.
130. Id. at 5:17.
131. Id. 34:13.







137. Alex Wolf, Ex-Linebacker Sues NFL, Former Team over Achilles Injury, LAW360




492 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
claims are preempted by the CBA.140 In January 2017, Ryans urged the
Texas federal court to send his claims back to state court arguing his com-
plaint specifically disclaimed any remedy under the CBA, and his claims
are state tort claims that do not require interpretation of the CBA, citing
to Bush.141
4. In re National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury
Litigation
In November 2013, over a dozen former NHL players first filed suit
against the NHL alleging the NHL failed to warn its players of the short
and long-term effects of repeated concussions and head trauma, failed to
adequately care for its players after the injuries, and promoted and glori-
fied unreasonable and unnecessary violence leading to head trauma.142
The NHL moved to dismiss, arguing Section 301 preemption.143 The
motion referenced four decades of collective bargaining between the
NHL and the NHLPA.144 The league argued that “because an evaluation
of the existence and extent of those duties would require interpretation of
the terms of the CBAs,” all claims are preempted.145 In May 2016, Judge
Nelson of the District of Minnesota denied the motion allowing the case
to go to discovery.146 Nelson stated that if discovery reveals that the
plaintiffs’ claims “accrued while they were subject to a CBA, and that
those claims are substantially dependent on interpretation of the CBA,
then the court could properly determine that the claims are preempted by
labor law preemption.”147 The NHL filed a motion to stay discovery,
which was determined moot by the denial of the motion to dismiss.148
Thus, the plaintiffs were granted access to reams of the NHL’s private
documents.149
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 301 PREEMPTION APPLICATION
After Judge Brody avoided the essential question of Section 301 pre-
emption in Turner by mandating mediation, Section 301 preemption has
been the highlight of almost all claims brought by professional athletes.
140. Zachary Zager, Ex-NFLer Says Texans Turf Injury Suit Belongs in State Court,
LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/876895/ex-nfler-says-texans-turf-in-
jury-suit-belongs-in-state-court [https://perma.cc/8BRN-G9AV].
141. Id.
142. Case Information, NHL CONCUSSION LITIGATION, http://www.nhlconcussionlitiga-
tion.com/information.html [https://perma.cc/3A3W-MVSH ] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
143. In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856,
863 (D. Minn. 2016).
144. Id. at 859.
145. Id. at 868.
146. Id. at 881–82.
147. Brian Amaral, NHL Concussion Suit Needs More Discovery, Judge Rules, LAW360
(Mar 18, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/797701/nhl-concussion-suit-needs-more-
discovery-judge-rules [https://perma.cc/N4GM-2JF4].
148. In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d at
882.
149. See id.
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Just as before Turner, preemption is the first hurdle most players will
face.150 However, Judge Brody’s decision in the mega-lawsuit, along with
a shift in public opinion, has arguably changed the way courts have ap-
plied Section 301 preemption.151 Courts now apply the doctrine nar-
rowly—the way some argue it was always meant to be applied—to allow
the victims to be remedied adequately and to hold the appropriate de-
fendants liable.
A. REINING IN THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
1. Turner v. NFL Set the Stage
While there may be some argument as to whether the settlement in
Turner was an adequate remedy for the former players, there is no disa-
greement that the estimated $900 million settlement was better than forc-
ing each player to file individual grievances to be settled via arbitration,
which would have been the result had Judge Brody granted the league’s
motion to dismiss based on preemption.152 Judge Brody’s decision to
mandate mediation before ruling on preemption sparked countless dis-
cussions among the community.153 Scholars noted that, regardless of the
settlement, the resolution of the preemption question was still relevant
for future lawsuits not only in the NFL but also in other professional
sports, such as the NHL.154
While some scholars opined that the claims in Turner would not have
been preempted by Section 301, the stronger arguments have concluded
that the former players’ claims would have been preempted by Section
301 based on the precedent leading up to the case.155 Relying on Stringer,
Deurson, and Maxwell, scholars have noted the broad protection Section
301 preemption gave teams and leagues in similar lawsuits.156 These
scholars argue that the broad application of whether “interpretation” of
the CBA is required to resolve the claim would have caused the court to
preempt all of the claims under Section 301, even though the duties the
plaintiffs rely on in their complaint are concededly independent of the
CBA.157
150. See Sagerian, supra note 6.
151. See supra text accompanying note 84.
152. See James, supra note 89.
153. See Ken Belson, Judge Orders N.F.L. Concussion Case to Mediation, N.Y. TIMES
(July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/sports/football/judge-orders-nfl-concus
sion-case-to-mediation.html (Perma link unavailable); Gary Mihoces, Judge Orders Media-
tion on NFL Concussion Suits, USA TODAY (July 11, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/nfl/2013/07/11/nfl-players-concussions-lawsuits/2510275/ [https://perma.cc/
78E4-TV6L].
154. Telis, supra note 11, at 1845–46.
155. Compare Telis, supra note 11, at 1867–68 (arguing the claims in Turner should
have been preempted) with Guccione, supra note 10, at 939 (holding Section 301 preemp-
tion should not apply in Turner).
156. See Telis, supra note 11, at 1856–60; Heard, supra note 18, at 233.
157. See Telis, supra note 11, at 1867–68.
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Thus, Judge Brody’s decision was arguably a victory for the players, as
many noted that the NFL was much more likely to settle once Brody
mandated mediation, not to mention the cost and threat of public discov-
ery.158 Perhaps Judge Brody, like much of the public, wanted to see these
players adequately remedied, and did not want the league to escape lia-
bility merely because the Section 301 preemption doctrine had expanded
greatly since its establishment.
Following the notion that Judge Brody could have easily granted the
league’s motion to dismiss by simply citing precedent, it seems that Judge
Brody did not want to continue to allow professional leagues and teams
to easily hide behind Section 301 preemption and evade accountability in
a world that is demanding the defendants take responsibility for their
actions.
2. Adding to the Confusion of Section 301 Preemption—the Narrow
Application After Turner v. NFL
As set out above, professional athletes have brought several new law-
suits since the Turner settlement in 2015.159 Judge Brody’s decision un-
doubtedly influenced many of these new lawsuits, as the defense of
Section 301 preemption was no longer a sure-fire win for defendants. In
fact, after Turner, there has arguably been a shift in the way courts are
handling cases brought by professional athletes. It seems judges are no
longer applying Section 301 broadly and allowing defendants to quickly
be shielded by the doctrine. There is no better example of this than the
Evans decision.160
Once the motion to transfer Evans to Judge Alsup was granted, hope
was slim for the plaintiffs because Judge Alsup had recently dismissed
Dent on preemption grounds.161 Even the plaintiff’s attorneys seemed
surprised when Judge Alsup denied the league’s motion to dismiss, stat-
ing, “[i]t’s a historic decision to have a class-action case such as this over-
come the NFL’s tried and true preemption argument.”162 He continued,
“[t]hey [the league] rely on the fact that there’s a collective bargaining
agreement under labor law to avoid having to face the music in class-
action suits by former players and to answer to allegations of wrong-
doing.”163
While this decision was a victory for the plaintiffs and will hopefully
answer many unknown questions on the NFL teams’ involvement in
158. See Guccione, supra note 10, at 923.
159. See Mihoces & Axon, supra note 87.
160. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016 WL
3566945, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
161. See Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. CV WMN-15-1457, 2016
WL 759208, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 25, 2016).
162. Rick Maese, Judge Allows Former NFL Players’ Suit over Drug Use to Procced,
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these serious charges, the decision undeniably confused the application of
Section 301 preemption once more. Judge Alsup, presumably knowing
the inconsistency and confusion he was creating, attempted to distinguish
Evans from his prior decision in Dent.164
The first difference he stated is that the claims in Dent were directed at
the NFL, whereas the Evans claims were directed at the individual
clubs.165 However, after stating this difference was one of the reasons the
case did not require the same result as Dent, he failed to explain what
bearing that has on Section 301 preemption.166 Since one of the objec-
tives of preemption is to prevent interference with CBAs, it seems incon-
sistent that almost identical claims against the NFL, who is not even a
signatory to the CBA, are preempted while claims against the NFL clubs,
who are a direct party to the CBA, are not preempted.167 Judge Alsup
failed to explain how the change in defendant alters the analysis, which
left a massive hole in his opinion, especially when it seems the opposite of
his opinion is more consistent with the objectives of the law.168
The second difference he cited is that in Evans, the claims were di-
rected at intentional conduct of the clubs, whereas the Dent claims were
focused on negligent conduct.169 This distinction is simply untrue. While
there were claims of negligence alleged in Dent, Judge Alsup also dis-
missed intentional tort claims based on Section 301 preemption.170
The last point Judge Alsup made is that because the claim in Evans
alleged violations of the Controlled Substances Act and the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, the terms of the CBA do not have to be interpreted
since the CBA “could not have validly sanctioned the indiscriminate dis-
tribution of medications in violation of these statutes,” and thus, the ille-
gality exception applied.171 However, as the NFL clubs argued, the
statutes do not allow for a private cause of action and thus, alleging a
violation of the statutes is merely a way for plaintiffs to avoid Section 301
preemption.172 Judge Alsup’s only attempt to explain this confusion was
to say that even though plaintiffs’ claims are anchored in common law,
“those types of claims can look to statutes to define standards of
conduct.”173
Yet, Judge Alsup could have arguably come to the same conclusion just
a couple of years earlier in Dent. In the Dent opinion, he wrote:
164. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101.
165. See supra text accompanying note 98.
166. See Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, No. C 16-01030 WHA, 2016
WL 3566945, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2016).
167. See Heard, supra note 18, at 227.
168. See Evans, 2016 WL 3566945, at *3–5.
169. Id. at *3.
170. Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).
171. Evans, 2016 WL 3566945, at *4.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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To be sure, the operative complaint here alleges violations of federal
and state statutes-but only as an antecedent and predicate for follow-
on state common law claims. No right of action is allowed or asserted
under the statutes themselves. Those statutes creep into our picture
only as a step in an ordinary negligence theory.174
Accordingly, both the claims in Evans and Dent rely on state common
law claims and not on a right of action under a statute itself.175 Nonethe-
less, Judge Alsup established a distinction between the claims and al-
lowed Evans to proceed with the illegality exception.176
As demonstrated, there seems to be no appropriate legal distinction
between Evans and Dent. Thus, Judge Alsup’s statement in Evans that
the “Court is unwilling to categorically immunize defendant clubs’ illegal
and indiscriminate distribution of painkillers as alleged in the complaint”
may help shed some light on the motivation of the decision.177 Perhaps,
after dismissing Dent, the court was as appalled as the public by the
thought of the NFL team doctors and trainers “giving [painkillers] out
like candy” to the players with no regard to the long-term health risks in
order “to get players ‘back on the field’ as quickly as possible.”178 As
Judge Bybee of the Ninth Circuit stated, “It makes me wonder if Judge
Alsup didn’t have the courage of his conviction in the Dent case.”179
Similarly, many legal experts saw the decision in Bush as a surprise and
success for Bush as he overcame the threshold CBA issue.180 While the
court relied on Judge Perry’s language in Green, the Rams arguably had a
solid claim that the CBA, to which the Rams and Bush are both parties,
addresses the parties’ responsibilities to monitor and protect player safety
and provide players with medical care, compensation, and other benefits
if they are injured during a game.181 Moreover, the CBA established a
committee tasked with making recommendations regarding player safety
and welfare aspects of playing surfaces and stadium facilities.182
When evaluating the claim, it seems that, based on Stringer, Duerson,
and Maxwell, the court could have certainly kept the case in federal court
based on Section 301 preemption.183 Just as in Stringer and Maxwell, the
174. Dent, 2014 WL 7205048, at *10.
175. Id.; Evans, 2016 WL 3566945, at *4.
176. Evans, 2016 WL 3566945, at *4.
177. Id.
178. Des Bieler, Calvin Johnson Says Painkillers Were Handed Out ‘Like Candy’ to
NFL Players, WASH. POST (July 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/07/06/calvin-johnson-says-painkillers-were-handed-out-like-candy-to-nfl-
players/?utm_term=.0e8d48cd2a26 [https://perma.cc/V5DP-MXCG].
179. Oral Argument at 27:34, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA,
2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gv
VpIviwKw [https://perma.cc/UB7D-AY66].
180. Zachary Zagger, Pro-Athlete Personal Injury Liability Claims Taking Hold,
LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/857101/pro-athlete-personal-in-
jury-liability-claims-taking-hold [https://perma.cc/DSX9-2CBG].
181. Bush v. St. Louis Reg’l Convention, No. 4:16CV250 JCH, 2016 WL 3125869, at *2
(E.D. Mo. June 3, 2016).
182. Id. at *3.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 50–64.
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court could have held that because the CBA places primary responsibility
on the teams and the committee, the CBA provisions doing so “must . . .
be taken into account in determining the degree of care owed by the
[Rams].”184 Moreover, since the CBA actually addressed the team’s role
in monitoring and protecting players during games, this is arguably a
much stronger case for preemption than in Duerson, where the court had
to use a multi-step argument to apply Section 301 preemption.185
Furthermore, in the recent victory for the Boogaard family,186 it seems
Judge Feinerman leniently gave the plaintiff a second chance for a rem-
edy. Judge Feinerman distinguished the new claims, which are not pre-
empted, by noting “they allege that the NHL actively harmed
Boogaard.”187 Judge Feinerman dismissed the defendant’s argument that
the new counts were “‘repackaged’ versions of the other, preempted
claims” very quickly, considering he also cited the Seventh Circuit, which
stated, “[p]reemption under § 301 ‘covers not only obvious disputes over
labor contracts, but also any claim masquerading as a state-law claim that
nevertheless is deemed “really” to be a claim under a labor contract.’”188
In his memorandum originally dismissing Boogaard’s claims, Judge
Feinerman emphasized that the court must evaluate the substance of the
plaintiff’s claims when determining if they are preempted.189 However, in
allowing these new counts to go forward, Judge Feinerman, perhaps, was
too quick to reject the defendant’s argument, as the new claims merely
went from alleging that the NHL failed to eliminate violence to alleging
that the NHL actively promoted violence.190 The substance of the claims
seem unaffected. Judge Feinerman likely could have relied on Stringer or
Duerson to preempt the claims, as those cases also dealt with an active
role by the defendant but nonetheless required interpretation of the CBA
to determine the relationships between the parties.191 While action versus
failure to act has been an important legal distinction in many areas of the
law, this decision arguably gives plaintiffs a way around Section 301 pre-
emption by merely alleging that the league or team actively harmed the
player instead of alleging that they failed to protect the player. Moreover,
from a policy standpoint, if the purpose of the LMRA was “to provide
orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either
184. See supra text accompanying notes 50–55, 61–64; Stringer v. NFL, 474 F. Supp. 2d
894, 911 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
185. Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *4–6
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012) (holding the court would have to determine if the clubs’ duty was
imposed by the CBA and then establish if the NFL’s duty was violated based on whether
the club’s duty was triggered).
186. Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 13 C 4846, 2016 WL 5476242, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 29, 2016).
187. Id.
188. Id. at *2–3 (quoting Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 725 F.3d 795, 797 (7th Cir.
2013)).
189. Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
190. See Boogaard, 2016 WL 5476242, at *3.
191. See Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1,
*6 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012); Stringer v. NFL, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 914 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
498 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
[employee or employer] with the legitimate rights of the other,” the dis-
tinction does not seem to be of great significance.192 Notably, while Judge
Feinerman did not state it as a reason for allowing the amended com-
plaint, the six-month limit on bringing claims to arbitration under the
CBA passed for the Boogaard family, and thus, litigation is the only rem-
edy for the family.193
Finally, the former NHL players had great success when Judge Nelson
denied the NHL’s motion to dismiss in May 2016.194 One of the lawyers
representing the players stated, “Judge Nelson’s order denying the NHL’s
motion to dismiss on preemption grounds is a[ ] historic decision in
American sports [and] labor law.”195 Judge Nelson’s decision was impera-
tive for the plaintiffs, as the outcome was quite uncertain after Judge
Brody did not rule on preemption in Turner.196 The decision means the
NHL will be forced to turn over hundreds of private documents, which
may be an incentive for the NHL to come to the settlement table.197
While Judge Nelson stated that she would reevaluate the preemption is-
sue after discovery, it undoubtedly puts pressure on the league as to
whether they want to risk going to trial or settling.198
Just as many legal scholars opine that Judge Brody could have easily
dismissed the case for preemption, the same argument can be made here.
At the beginning of the analysis, Judge Nelson emphasized that they
should “adopt[ ] a ‘narrow[ ] approach’” to interpreting precedent on the
preemption doctrine.199 While Judge Nelson makes a compelling argu-
ment that discovery is needed to determine which players and which
CBAs are perhaps relevant, the critical portion of the opinion is the at-
tempt to distinguish the precedent that broadly applied Section 301
preemption.200
For example, Judge Nelson distinguished Stringer and Dent by noting
that, in those cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the NFL failed to use rea-
sonable care in providing information to the teams’ personnel, but in this
case, the plaintiffs alleged that the NHL breached a duty that runs
192. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012).
193. Diana Novak Jones, Judge Could Keep NHL Wrongful Death Suit Alive, LAW360
(April 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/784738/judge-could-keep-nhl-wrongful-
death-suit-alive [https://perma.cc/TMX4-8FZL].
194. In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856,
882 (D. Minn. 2016).
195. Adam Kilgore, Judge Denies NHL’s Motion to Dismiss Retired Players’ Concus-
sion Suit, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/
2016/05/18/retried-nhl-players-win-legal-victory-over-nhl-in-class-action-concussion-suit/
?utm_term=.1ff10660214c [https://perma.cc/H422-AZFD].
196. See supra text accompanying note 84.
197. Ken Belson, Judge Rejects N.H.L’s Bid to Dismiss Concussion Suit, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/sports/hockey/judge-rejects-nhls-bid-
to-dismiss-concussion-suit.html?_r=0 (Perma link unavailable).
198. In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d at
860.
199. Id. at 867 (quoting Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.
1998)).
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straight from the league to the players.201 However, this analysis is simply
incorrect because the plaintiffs in Dent also made allegations that run
straight from the NFL to the players, and yet, those claims were pre-
empted by Section 301.202 Moreover, in Dent and Stringer, the NFL was
not a signatory to the CBA, but here, the NHL is a direct party to the
CBA, and thus the analogy is further flawed.203 The court’s effort to dis-
tinguish these precedents therefore fails.
Most importantly, it appears that Duerson is directly on point to this
case and would necessarily require preemption.204 Just as in Duerson,
even though the CBA provisions concerning health and safety are duties
of the clubs and not the NHL itself, Judge Nelson could have held that
they would have to interpret the CBA to determine whether the club’s
duty was triggered, and then, that would be “one factor tending to show
that the [NHL’s] alleged failure to take action to protect [the players]
from concussive brain trauma was reasonable.”205
However, notably, the Court “respectfully disagree[d]” with the rea-
soning in Duerson.206 Judge Nelson stated that the Duerson court’s con-
clusion that the “duty the NFL owed to the players would be tempered by
the CBA’s imposition of duties on the teams” “without any citation to the
CBA or case law” is incorrect.207 Judge Nelson felt it was premature to
find the plaintiffs’ claims preempted since the alleged breached duties
were those that ran directly from the NFL, who was not a party to the
CBA, to the players.208 It appears that under Judge Nelson’s much nar-
rower approach, the claims against the NHL, who was a party to the
CBA, should naturally be preempted before those in Duerson. Judge Nel-
son seems to agree with Duerson’s attorney in the case who noted, “[a]
successful bid by the NFL to keep the case in federal court would ‘greatly
expand preemption and federal question jurisdiction to a degree never
contemplated by the legislature or our courts.’”209
Thus, this opinion demonstrates the court’s issue with applying Section
301 preemption broadly to the cases today. Ultimately, Judge Nelson
erred on the side of caution in this case by applying Section 301 preemp-
tion much more narrowly than the NHL and precedent suggested.
201. Id. at 876–78 n.9.
202. Oral Argument at 27:35, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA,
2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gv
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B. THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION
In many of the recent cases on the issue, the courts have not allowed
the defendants to escape liability using Section 301 preemption. How-
ever, as demonstrated above, the courts’ analysis of the doctrine through-
out these cases does not quite square with precedent nor does it aid in
clarifying the application of the doctrine. Arguably, these decisions are
narrowing the preemption doctrine as a response to increased public
opinion that our legal system should force the leagues and teams to be
accountable for their decisions.
When news that these high-contact sports potentially cause serious
short-term and long-term injuries came to light in the early to mid-2000’s,
the public initially put responsibilities on the athletes.210 The media por-
trayed the athletes’ motivation for competition and attention as the
source for aggression and unnecessary hits.211 The idea was that “sacrific-
ing one’s body for the sake of sporting glory is a key tenet” in the game,
and it leads to “more exposure and idol status.”212
However, as more information has been released on the leagues’ and
teams’ roles in failing to prevent these injuries or even encouraging them,
the media switched the public’s focus to the leagues, the multi-billion dol-
lar industries, taking advantage of these athletes.213 The response has
been sympathy for the players and placing blame on the leagues.214 The
media even began blaming the trainers for not having the courage or au-
thority to tell a player he cannot go back in the game after a concus-
sion.215 The media also began scrutinizing the NFL for not attributing
enough resources to research on concussions and the players’ equip-
ment.216 This led the NFL to donate over $30 million to research on trau-
matic brain injuries, as they wanted to demonstrate that they were taking
some responsibility on the issue.217
There is no denying the impact the media has on public opinion, partic-
ularly in professional sports.218 As a Harvard Law School study stated,
“[t]he general public consequently forms opinions about football concus-
sions in a way that is colored by the information that ESPN chooses to
broadcast and the attitude which TV presenters adopt towards these inju-
ries.”219 In 2016, a study showed that 94% of American adults believe
that concussion and head injuries from participation in sports are a public
210. Shockey, John, Media Framing of the NFL Concussion Crisis Is Changing the Cul-
ture of the NFL, 3–4 (Mar. 7, 2014), available at http:/www.jlshock.com/documents/writing/
MediaFramingofNFLConcussionCrisis_Shockey.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8BL-L3M4].
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216. Shockey, supra note 210, at 13.
217. Id. at 12.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id. at 7.
2017] Open Field for Professional Athlete Litigation 501
health issue, and 65% say such injuries are a major problem.220 Over half
of those who identified as NFL fans said the league did not do enough to
address the issue, and 42% of professional hockey fans agreed with re-
spect to the NHL.221 In October 2016, members of Congress asked the
NHL for more answers from the commissioner about what the league is
doing about concussions in hockey.222 The same congressional committee
has also targeted the NFL for not taking appropriate action.223
In 2014, even former President Obama weighed in on concussions and
called for more research into youth concussions, signaling an effort by
Obama to use the power of the presidency to elevate a national conversa-
tion about concussions, noting that we need to change a culture that says,
“suck it up.”224 One former NHL player met with members of the
Obama administration to tell his story and draw attention to the effects
concussions have on the brains of hockey players.225 He commented,
“[t]his can’t be tucked under the rug anymore, . . . [w]e were all young
children aspiring to be NHL hockey players. And we finally get to that
point, and it’s led us into so many situations of depression, anxiety, addic-
tions. And the root cause is concussions.”226
While the debate continues on whether public opinion should impact
the legal analysis of our judicial system, public opinion inevitably does so
regardless.227 Recently, in In Re National Hockey Concussion Injury Liti-
gation, the league urged the court to deny the plaintiff’s request to force
the league to unseal specific documents, arguing the players would use
the documents “to ‘influence the court of public opinion.’”228 The shift in
public attitude towards holding the leagues and teams responsible for
keeping professional athletes safe has caused the courts to reign in the
Section 301 preemption doctrine, ignoring and misapplying precedent.
While the impact for plaintiffs and public opinion may be positive, the
confusion on Section 301 preemption continues to grow. The recent case
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law is perhaps frustrating the purpose of Section 301 preemption—to
have “uniformity of interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
and prevention of interference with those agreements”229—as it demon-
strates the various applications of Section 301 preemption with a myriad
of factors in play.
Thus, while the narrower application of Section 301 is a positive change
in terms of public policy, as it forces these defendants to take responsibil-
ity for their actions and does not allow them to hide behind the shield of
Section 301, it has further confused precedent in this area. Moreover, it
has other serious potential impacts in this area of the law.
V. PREDICTIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND A NEED
FOR CLARIFICATION
A. PREDICTIONS OF PENDING CASES
After the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments in Dent, the court will
likely reverse Judge Alsup in part or in whole.230 The panel seemed per-
plexed by how Judge Alsup’s decisions in Dent and Evans can possibly
co-exist.231 Judge ByBee was “scratching his head” after reading Evans
and stated he could not figure out why preemption would not apply to the
clubs, but would to the league.232 Moreover, Judge Kozinksi was highly
concerned with the precedent that Dent sets in terms of allowing a “ran-
dom defendant,” who is not a party to the CBA, to be shielded by the
CBA.233
Since Evans, Boogaard, and In Re National Hockey Concussion Injury
Litigation have all been decided since Dent, the Ninth Circuit will have
plenty of ammunition to reverse Dent.234 Just as in In Re National
Hockey Concussion Injury Litigation, the plaintiffs in Dent are merely
asking for discovery at this point.235 It is unlikely that the court will allow
the inconsistencies referenced above between Dent and Evans to stand as
good law. The court is free to preempt some claims or all of them, so it
will also be greatly significant if the court reverses both the negligence
and intentional tort claims or just some of them.
The plaintiffs should also have success in Boogaard because it is un-
likely that Judge Feinerman will reconsider his decision to allow the sec-
ond amended complaint.236 Judge Feinerman went to great lengths to
229. Heard, supra note 18.
230. See Oral Argument, Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014
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explain how the first four claims are not preempted.237 He emphasized
that the NHL did not show how the duty to not unreasonably harm
others “would require interpretation of the CBA.”238 Until the Supreme
Court states that a plaintiff cannot escape Section 301 by merely changing
their claim from a failure to act to an active misdeeds claim, Judge Feiner-
man will likely stand by his decision.
The decision in the DeMeco Ryans case is of great significance as well.
While Ryans’ complaint noted, “the CBA is not the source of any claim
asserted” and Bush is a clear precedent for remand, Bush may be distin-
guished since it occurred after the play had ended.239 Unlike in Bush,
Ryans’ injury occurred in the middle of the field of play, which may im-
pact the court’s analysis.240 However, assuming the court does follow the
narrow interpretation in Bush and Green, noting that “[m]ere reference
to part of a CBA is insufficient,” Ryans will be able to evade preemption,
and the case will be remanded to state court.241
Finally, the NHL will undoubtedly raise the Section 301 preemption
defense again in In Re National Hockey Concussion Litigation. The re-
cent victory in Boogaard, unless reversed, will likely be used as strong
precedent by the plaintiffs to defend a Section 301 preemption claim, as
they also allege that the NHL actively harmed the players. Moreover,
because Judge Nelson misapplied Stringer and Dent and subsequently dis-
regarded Duerson, even if post-discovery it is clear to the court which
players are subject to certain CBAs, it is unlikely Judge Nelson will dis-
miss all the claims because of preemption.242 Judge Nelson has already
stated the court will apply the doctrine narrowly, and she will now be able
to use the Evans decisions as significant precedent.243
Due to this new precedent in favor of the plaintiff and Judge Nelson’s
narrow application, the NHL may look to discuss a settlement as in Tur-
ner. The NHL will likely want to avoid the chance that any or all of the
claims will be preempted and risk having to fund state court litigation.
Moreover, the NHL has already been very reluctant in the case to hand
over certain documents during discovery.244 Thus, they may want to settle
prior to disclosing any more private information. A major issue, then, will
be the appropriate settlement amount. As evidenced by Turner, the court
will want to ensure that there will be enough funds to pay all players.
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B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PREEMPTION APPLICATION
Besides causing continual confusion, the narrower application of Sec-
tion 301 preemption has other implications as well. Specifically, there will
be an impact on collective bargaining agreement negotiations, settlement
negotiations, insurance premiums, and new lawsuits in this area. The cur-
rent NHL CBA is only applicable for five more years, and the current
NFL CBA is only applicable for three more years.245 Thus, both the play-
ers’ associations and the NHL and NFLMC will have to determine what
is important for each party in future negotiations. This recent case law
will undoubtedly have an impact on those negotiations.
The leagues will certainly want to cover a broader range of potential
claims to strengthen their arguments in court that CBA interpretation is
required. Moreover, the leagues will inevitably be more concerned than
prior years with the availability of funds for state-law tort claims, as many
of the recent claims would have been arbitrated under the old, broader
application of Section 301. While this seems beneficial for the players, the
associations will likely not want to allow the leagues to put in these broad
coverage provisions, especially since the players have had so much suc-
cess in their lawsuits lately. Thus, it may force the players’ associations to
give in on other key issues such as player benefits. They also will likely be
left negotiating the salary caps at a lower level due to the need for the
league to retain funds for the state-law claims.
As Turner demonstrated, the threat that Section 301 preemption will
not apply to the players’ claims will likely lead to an increase in the
leagues and teams coming to the settlement table much sooner than
before. The unknown and virtually uncapped amount of damages availa-
ble in state court will be a huge consideration for the defendants.246
Moreover, as seen recently, discovery, while not only expensive, exposes
the leagues and teams to even more public scrutiny.247 Thus, potential for
massive discovery may also push the teams towards settlement.
Another major implication of the recent case law is the impact on in-
surance costs and insurance litigation for defendants. For example, since
the settlement in Turner, the NFL has been in intense litigation with its
insurance companies.248 The insurers are suing to avoid paying the settle-
ment, and in May 2016, a New York state judge forced the league to
make its officials and doctors, as well as relevant documents, available to
the insurance companies.249 The league argues this undermines their set-
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tlement.250 Thus, not only may insurance costs rise for the teams and
leagues after these recent cases, but they will also be very apprehensive
about the costs to litigate with the insurers as well as the possibility of
information still being made public.251 As one insurance attorney stated
in response to Bush and Ryans’ recent success,
It seems to be new, and if history is any indication of what is coming,
I bet plaintiffs lawyers are taking note as well, and there could be
several more copycat lawsuits to follow, which is why I would be
advising other teams and leagues to put their insurers on notice. . . .
In my world, the most important advice would be that all of these
entities have general liability policies with a duty to defend all poten-
tial liabilities, including bodily injury.252
As just noted, there is no doubt that plaintiff’s attorneys are watching
the recent success of players and preparing their cases. One litigator
commented:
I think what you are seeing is a greater awareness of injury in foot-
ball, and I think it begins with CTE [a progressive degenerative dis-
ease found in people who have had a severe blow or repeated blows
to the head] and concussions, but it does not end there. . . . I think
with a greater awareness, people are showing more of a willingness
to pursue claims.253
After these recent cases, it is likely that lawsuits will continue to roll in,
and the plaintiffs will surely be cautious in their complaints to not ex-
pressly assert any claim under the CBA. Moreover, until the Supreme
Court gives clarification, plaintiffs will likely focus their claims on the ille-
gality exception, allegations of actively harming the player, and appealing
to the court to allow justice for the players who were harmed by these
multi-billion dollar industries.
C. THE SUPREME COURT MUST OFFER CLARIFICATION
As discussed, the new line of cases has confused Section 301 preemp-
tion even further. Thus, there is a serious need for clarification in this
area of the law. The Supreme Court should take the opportunity with this
new influx of cases to grant certiorari and clarify the doctrine. The main
issues that need to be addressed are the illegality exception, active versus
failure to act claims, the appropriate standard for interpretation of the
CBA, and what role injustice should have in the application.
The inconsistencies in Judge Alsup’s application of the illegality excep-
tion in Dent and Evans demonstrate this need for clarification.254 Specifi-
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cally, the Court should address whether the plaintiffs must assert a direct
violation of a state or federal statute, under which they have a private
remedy, or if a violation of a statute as part of negligence theory is
enough. The second amended complaint in Boogaard shows a need for
the Court to explain the impact on preemption when the plaintiffs allege
claims of action versus claims of inaction.255 Without clarification, this
case necessarily leaves a loophole for plaintiffs to avoid Section 301
preemption.
In Re National Hockey Concussion Injury Litigation is a prime example
of the confusion in applying the appropriate standard for whether the
court will have to “interpret” the CBA.256 Confusing and disagreeing
with crucial precedent, Judge Nelson ignored the broad application of
“interpretation” and held the claim “must require the interpretation of
some specific provision of a CBA.”257 Thus, the Court should step in and
clarify the standard for lower courts. Finally, the Court needs to address
whether the plaintiffs’ options for other recourse should be a factor in the
Section 301 preemption analysis. For example, in In Re National Hockey
Concussion Injury Litigation, Judge Nelson noted that the plaintiffs
would be unable to access arbitration, and in Boogaard, the time for arbi-
tration for the family had passed. Thus, litigation was the only recourse
for the Boogarrd family.258 However, in oral arguments for Dent, Judge
Smith on the Ninth Circuit stated:
I understand justice, but all we are trying to do is look at what the
law is and apply it. The [lack of] prejudice [to the defendant], I ap-
preciate your argument, but I didn’t find anything that suggests that
ought to be something I ought to be looking at in determining
preemption.259
Therefore, the Court should answer whether other recourse for the plain-
tiffs, or lack of prejudice to the defendant, should be a consideration in
preemption decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of lawsuits brought by professional athletes will inevitably
continue to grow in the coming years due to the recent success of many
players in overcoming Section 301 preemption. If courts follow the recent
decisions and disregard precedent, the leagues and teams will be forced
to respond. The current narrow application of Section 301 reflects the
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recent increase in the public’s awareness of the leagues’ and teams’ roles
in player injuries. As the concern of athlete injury at the youth and pro-
fessional levels continues to rise, the public pressure to hold the leagues
and teams accountable will persist. Thus, the Supreme Court must ad-
dress the application of Section 301 preemption to avoid any further con-
fusion on the role of Section 301 preemption in these cases.
